Reforming bodies under surveillance: an urgent task for theological education

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In attending to the relationship between surveillance and human flourishing, this chapter contributes to filling the gap in theological education around recognising that digitized, deconstructed bodies in cyberspace have material implications for people’s life chances. It considers theological works on contemporary surveillance and places the issues in relation to van der Ploeg’s ‘informationized body’ and Swinton’s proposal for the ‘resurrection of the person’. Patel’s problematizing of the browning of bodies under surveillance brings engagement with media mis-representation of marginalized groups. The chapter’s core argument is that digitized bodies need reforming as social persons and that subjects of surveillance deserve formation that is not driven by prevailing social prejudices. The core theological claim is that cruciform, rather than hierarchical, surveillance demands Christian solidarity with people who find themselves under diverse forms of unjust surveillance. The chapter concludes with a call to the Church to assess its own participation in cultures of surveillance.

Introduction

Surveillance and human flourishing are interwoven in everyday life. Theological concerns to articulate authentic personhood cannot therefore be adequately developed without taking careful notice of this increasingly important dimension of social experience. Privacy vis-à-vis the state was, arguably, once the most significant issue when regimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China developed bureaucratic systems of keeping watch over their own citizens, often by recruiting neighbours and work colleagues. It was important to craft an adequate theology of the (atheist) state; its limitations and the responsibility and scope of civil disobedience. Recently, the widespread collection and re-sale of personal information by global social media corporations has unsettled many individual users, communities, and governments (when democratic elections are perceived to be, if not necessarily proved to be, affected). Robust theologies of privacy are required in the face of rapid developments in the ease, speed, and hiddenness of transferring personal data.

Vast volumes of data are analyzed for patterns of behaviour (Big Data) using algorithms to categorise people and cross-reference multiple sources of information. It has become apparent that these automated processes are embedded in existing prejudices around race, ethnicity, class, religion, and gender. Surveillance is neither distributed equitably nor fairly across already marginalized groups. When it comes to encountering surveillance it matters that a data-subject is black, Muslim, poor, or female (with categories often over-lapping). Theologies of social
justice and liberation are required to critique new inequities before which notions of privacy fall short.

States and corporations are significant players but in a culture of surveillance (Lyon 2018) the public are often willing contributors of personal information, advocates of intensified monitoring, and users of surveillance technologies themselves. Under the constructed (although not unreal) threat of catastrophic or local terrorist crimes, fear of the stranger is stoked by sections of the mainstream and social media. Theologies of providence, risk, and safety under the Divine gaze are perhaps more important than ever to offer narratives for living in a contingent, watched and watching world. Churches can exacerbate ‘stranger danger’ through intemperate and prejudiced teaching. On the other hand, faith communities can extend understanding and solidarity through compassionate demonstration of Gospel values. Handling one’s own and others’ humanity in social media contexts is a task for 21st century theological education.

This chapter focuses on one aspect of surveillance; how digitized, deconstructed bodies in cyberspace have material implications for people’s life chances. Security, commercial, and bureaucratic justifications multiply as bodies are turned into information that can be analyzed for patterns in attitudes or behaviour. The core argument is that digitized bodies need re-forming as social persons and that subjects of surveillance deserve formation that is not driven by prevailing social prejudices. To pursue this investigation we briefly review recent theological works on contemporary surveillance. Irma van der Ploeg’s notion of the informatized body offers understanding of the need for a theological response that re-forms the body; John Swinton’s proposal for resurrecting the person is key here. Such a response is not practiced in the abstract, rather people are presented within complex social structures. Tina Patel’s discussion of the browning of bodies under surveillance introduces us to the insidious problem of mis-representation in the media. We turn to Jürgen Moltmann’s theology of Easter in order to set wrongful categorization of people against an eschatological horizon of God’s merciful apportioning of true identity. By taking notice of Christ’s as a body that was under (highly political and unjust) surveillance, we argue for the Church, as the ecclesial body of Christ, to make solidarity with those under surveillance, and to so do as an expression of holiness (in the manner of the unwittingly righteous who are applauded by Christ in his parable of the sheep and goats). Such cruciform surveillance, we conclude, replaces monarchical, domineering frames of monitoring with distributed, compassionate watching that confronts politically-motivated prejudices that surveillance re-inscribes upon marginalized groups and calls the Church to assess its own participation in cultures of surveillance.

Definitions

It is possible to define surveillance purely negatively, as does Christian Fuchs: ‘surveillance is the systematic collection and use of information in order to dominate individuals and groups’ (Fuchs 2017, 199). For Fuchs, surveillance is, “a specific form of control that forms one dimension of domination, exploitation, class, capitalism, patriarchy, racism, and similar negative phenomena” (Fuchs 2017, 199). On the other hand, we can think of surveillance as both good and bad, sometimes both at the same time. So, David Lyon suggests that surveillance is, “any systematic and routine attention to personal details, whether specific or aggregate, for a defined purpose. That purpose, the intention of the surveillance practice, may be to protect, understand, care for, ensure entitlement, control, manage or influence individuals or groups” (Lyon 2015, 3). The positive and negative possibilities of Lyon’s definition, rather than the purely negative of Fuchs, are more salient because Lyon’s captures the potential for surveillance to enhance human flourishing (albeit with careful critical consideration).

The sites of surveillance are numerous; including military intelligence, state administration, work monitoring, policing and crime control, and consumer activity (Lyon 2007, 25). To this list we might add domestic and friendship contexts, as well as civil society (particularly for our concerns here, religion but also education, and trades unions, etc.). Of course, these are not mutually-exclusive sites as, for example, surveillance can be practiced by friends and family over one-another in the context of their religious faith.

Human bodies are both sites and objects of surveillance in the sense that people’s actions are monitored and bodies are sources of data in other ways also. Biometric details are collected from the surface of bodies in the form of facial recognition measurement, iris and fingerprint patterns, or DNA samples (if taken from within the mouth there arise questions over the integrity of distinctions between sur-
face and interior). Opinions may also be collected and, in a holistic model of the human person, these cannot be understood as other than integrally related to the body of the opinion-holder. States, corporations, institutions and peers each have interests in bodies as sites and sources of surveillance data.

**Surveillance Studies and Theology**

The literature in the inter-disciplinary and multi-perspectival field of surveillance studies is extensive (Ball et al. 2012)). Theological considerations are, as yet, thin on the ground.

In the early 1970s a denominational report on credit scoring as a form of surveillance was remarkably prescient in highlighting concerns (United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. 1974). In the subsequent 40 years there has been a dearth of theological work on surveillance per se. A notable exception is David Lyon’s 1995 piece that makes overt the theological basis for his concern for human flourishing in his extensive sociological writings (Lyon 1995). Lyon returned to the theme of the eye of God in his contribution to the 2013 conference volume of the Society for the Study of Christian Ethics that focused on surveillance (Gregory 2014; Lyon 2014; Stoddart 2014; Townsend 2014). The eye of God has also been the theological centre point for Swedish systematician and human rights theologian, Susanne Wigorts Yngvesson who has drawn extensively on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Wigorts Yngvesson 2013). Rogério Gomes engages with theologies of the *imago Dei* and human dignity in his 2014 study and Rachel Muers has a small section on surveillance in her treatment of the Christian ethics of communication (Gomes 2014) (Muers 2004: 182–212). My own work has explored the saliency of a Christian, discursive, ethics of care as an overall approach to surveillance (Stoddart 2011). In 2017 the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland accepted a report from its Church and Society Council, “Surveillance and Social Justice,” that uses theological and biblical themes to focus attention on discrimination at borders and in the benefits systems, and challenges of de-anonymization of personal bio-data previously collected for medical research (Church and Society Council 2017). Privacy concerns have received theological treatment although these are not limited to issues of digital surveillance. This chapter, however, focuses on the body in material, representational and ecclesial modes.

**Re-forming Bodies**

People’s lived experiences are, by means of their digital traces, disassembled and reassembled, resulting in the generation of data-doubles (Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Although in one sense these are virtual (being coded constructions circulating in cyberspace), in another sense data-doubles are acted upon in ways that have material consequences for actual people. This might be in the realm of, for example, credit-scoring, retail offers, or progress at borders. When it is the human body itself that is the direct object of the surveillance gaze bodies are rendered machine readable (van der Ploeg 2006). Such a shift is not merely taking more information from bodies than was previously possible; these are developments in body ontology (van der Ploeg 2003, 67).

Irma van der Ploeg places the informational body as the most recent in a line of ontologies that have profoundly influenced not only perceptions of the bodies, but how bodies are respected. The anatomical-physiological body is the one that is perhaps most familiar to the lay person. In the early 20th century this ontology of the body was amended (although not wholly as a replacement) to encompass scientific discoveries. The endocrinological body “knows the body as a biochemical entity, with an ontology of chemical substances that are characterized in terms of messages, signals, and feedback loops” (van der Ploeg 2003, 64). With an impetus from the HIV-AIDS crisis of the 1980s another ontology of the body was promulgated; the immunological body. This body, within which cells are battling, became understood through a discourse akin to strategic defense and warfare. When sequencing of DNA and mapping of the human genome gathered pace the ontology of the body again changed. Language of “building blocks” and “blueprints” framed genetics in terms of coded information.

It is not difficult to appreciate how the integrity of such an “informatized body” needs to be re-framed under threat from new normative approaches. Van der Ploeg is correct to warn that “the presumed demarcation of where ‘the body itself’ stops and begins being ‘information’ will subtly shift, the moral and legal vocabularies available will no longer suffice” (van der Ploeg 2003, 67). Data-doubles constructed from the informationized body (both above and beneath its surfaces) are key elements in contemporary surveillance systems. Whilst it might once have been legitimate to draw a clear distinction between virtual and real worlds this is now any-

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thing but obvious. The gaze here is far more than mere watching; entities akin to selves are constructed and acted upon in the “real” world. What is effected in cyberspace or virtual reality may well have consequences that are experienced in vivid material reality by people who are denied entitlement or otherwise marginalized politically, economically, or socially.

One theological response to the informationization of the body might be to simply roll back later ontologies and constructions to give singular significance to the anatomical-physiological body. Here it is the fleshliness of the body that is the only real body. In contradistinction, transhumanism respects only a technologized-humanity in favour of an informationized “body” decoupled from its material limitations. Both attempts, as Elaine Graham has demonstrated, are inadequate responses to the hybridity of techno-human life. Graham acknowledges, “the fabricated, technologized worlds of human labour and artifice as equally capable of revealing the sacred as the innocence of ‘nature’” (Graham 2002, 233). Technology and nature are understood as both containing sacramental potential.

How then might the informatized body be reformed to better disclose God’s grace in the face of the scattering of digital traces and the potential loss of someone’s control over their re-configuration? A fruitful theological track lies by way of analogy with a response to dementia. John Swinton has addressed the claim that personhood is lost as dementia takes its grip. Swinton offers a paradigm of a person whose own memory is dissipating being held in the memories of God (Swinton 2012). The analogy here one might draw is between the scattering of memories and of digital traces. Swinton develops a third dimension to the notion of resurrection, alongside that of Christ’s physical body and of the eschatological resurrection of humanity. Resurrecting the person becomes also a pastoral challenge and responsibility to bring those who have been rendered invisible as non-persons (whose personhood is denied through social death) back to life (Swinton 2000).

Such resurrection of the person need not be reduced to a social project but can, in continuity with the other two meanings of resurrection, be taken as acts of Divine grace and power; albeit that in the social sense there is much demanded of human effort and compassionate interaction. In the context of surveillance (its data-doubles and the material body) resurrecting the person offers a useful perspective. On the one hand, it is indeed within God’s memories that digital traces and the whole gamut of human inner and outer experience is held. Traditional language of the resurrection of the body, taken as a paradigm rather than descriptive of eschatological outcomes, is suggestive of the gathering of the disparate elements of the human body and the making of a body that is both continuous and discontinuous with its earthly material form. So, if taken into the digital context, it is the power and love of God that honours – rather than despises – materiality, demonstrated in the bringing back together of the material and the digital traces of a life. As Rachel Muers so effectively reminds us, God has knowledge of us, not information about us and God’s knowledge is relational; within the covenantal relationship (Muers 2004).

On the other hand, there arises a social impetus is towards a critical re-formation of the person. It is a critical re-formation because we take neither material presentation or data-doubles to be necessarily authentic. Through no fault of a surveillance subject, their data-doubles might carry aspects that are the result of coding biases, perhaps exacerbated by partial or false data. It is incumbent upon us to question data-doubles for, just as in material life, we are read by others who are prejudiced; who have vested interests in normativity against which others are judged and found wanting (Althaus-Reid 2004). Within surveillance systems, risk is distributed neither equally nor fairly. Marginalized groups (such as those suffering mental illnesses or those on welfare benefits) are imputed with identities that are deemed to be disproportionately risky (Rose 2000, 2002).

So, the re-formation of the informatized body means bringing back together both the material and digital in a resurrection of the person in this world. This is, quite crucially, not a re-solidifying nor a restoration. It is not re-solidifying because the hybrid is continually in flux; the data-doubles generated by the surveillance gaze keep changing and the feedback loop results in changes for material bodies. Rather than metaphysics, the concern here is for the grace-inspired socio-political construction of embodied, digital, human experience. This takes place, however, in contexts of many forms of prejudice; racial, ethnic and religious discrimination being particularly prevalent in surveillance cultures where fear of terrorism is rampant. The reformation of the representation of informatized bodies is therefore urgently required.
Reforming Representation

People are presented (both to themselves and their neighbours) within complex social structures; knowledge of oneself and of the Other is always mediated. Identity is fundamentally social. It is important to consider the possible shaping of perceptions of other people when being under surveillance is part of their ascribed identity. Representation of those perceived to be a security threat is more complex still because targeting of surveillance is often directed towards not a specific racial or ethnic group but to a more general category of “brown bodies.” As Tina Patel observes, “within the terror-panic climate, all those marked out as brown are at worst considered to be (potential) terrorists – or at least sympathetic to it; or, at best, they have their citizenship status questioned” (Patel 2012). In their extensive study of structures of representation of Muslims, Peter Morey and Amina Yaqin observe that politicians, the media, and public discussion more generally rely on negative, reductive turns of expression. Such tropes are deployed in discussions of national security, multiculturalism, and integration. Genuine agency is denied to this broad category of people by discourse that obscures “a chronically one-sided dialogue that Muslims are invited to join but not change, or forever remain outside the boundaries of civil debate, doomed to be spoken for and represented, but never to speak themselves” (Morey and Yaqin 2011, 2). Public debate is diminished when “simplistic and politically manageable views” are substituted for “unwieldy and complex realities” (Morey and Yaqin 2011, 19). It is important to note that not all Muslims surrender to their stereotyping but some actively subvert these negative tropes with positive images. Nevertheless, Muslims seem so often to be required to defend themselves “against the always-lurking change of disloyalty” (Morey and Yaqin 2011, 45).

This is unjust for those so targeted and ought to be challenged by Christians in solidarity, on those grounds alone. However, the mis-representation of groups as deviant more widely degrades the Common Good in which Christians, like everyone else, have a vested interest. (Stoddart 2017). Quite explicitly, traditions of “not bearing false witness” (Exodus 20:16) challenge any political intention to deliberately mis-represent a category of people; whether migrants, Muslims, welfare recipients or other targets. Jesus’ example of reaching over social barriers (whether to a Roman, a Syrophoenician, a woman, or a tax-collector) is an injunction to counter (and not believe one is immune from practicing) mis-representation of groups in order to distance the Other.

However, within the more specific context of social sorting by surveillance systems, when the existence of categories into which one is placed may or may not be known to exist, a more complex theological challenge is required. I have argued elsewhere that Christians need to develop a suspicion of the mean, the “need to be sceptical of implicit or explicit it claims to the innocence of the statistical average” (Stoddart 2014, 9). This sliding of statistical norm into an ideology of normality, I have contended, goes hand in hand with being profoundly wary of the political category of evil. Rowan Williams expresses this succinctly regarding the ready-use of categories of evil. We are, says Williams, “writing them in” in terms that [can] be managed and manipulated’ (Williams 2002, 66).

Jürgen Moltmann’s theology of Easter hope casting a shadow back over the graves of history’s victims is helpful here (Moltmann 1974, 163). Suspicion of categories of people, in effect, tars all with the same brush. People are named in the present in the light of an imagined future in which their designation as “risky” is validated. Theirs is a future imagined by those with the temporal power to name “riskiness”. The imposition of such a future identity is then deployed to justify pre-emptive intervention. Of course, there are some people who turn out to be dangerous to others but the injustice and absence of compassion lies in directing suspicion towards whole (digitally-constructed) categories of people – whether “un-integrated Muslims,” “welfare scroungers,” or “undocumented immigrants.” A Christian theological critique rejects categorization that posits “a future for individuals and groups that obscures the shadow of the cross cast back from the resurrection future” (Stoddart 2014, 15).

Reforming representation of bodies under surveillance requires a theology that is not only critical of deliberate, but also of unconscious, misrepresentation. It requires perspectives that are not saturated with partisan political/media discourse but are viewed through a lens of a radical Gospel. For this reason, we require to reform a theology of the body of Christ as a surveilled and surveilling body.
Reforming the surveilled and surveilling body of Christ

Christ was under surveillance from the Pharisees, the leaders of the Jews, and (we can infer) by the Romans. We read of him being criticised for failing to police the ritual purity of his disciples (Matt. 15:2) and for his inflammatory table fellowship with those considered disreputable (e.g. Luke 5:30). His allusions to a Messianic role (albeit qualified to differentiate him from violent proponents) brought him to the attention of leaders who sought to catch him out in words. In one sense, in seeking his baptism Jesus needed John the Baptist to vouch for him (Matt. 3:13); Jesus was an “undocumented worker.” He is a symbol of those denied valid identification for he is only Joseph’s son (Luke 4:22) for nothing good can come from Nazareth (John 1:46). It is clear that categorical suspicion predates digital surveillance. Yet Jesus has access to the Nazareth synagogue to read the scripture although his is identified as a radical preacher, knowing enough to pass as an insider yet also to pose a threat. He is a symbol too of those wrongly categorized. Jesus attempts to avoid mis-recognition as a military messiah but in a heightened state of alert he is categorized alongside similar rebel movements (cf. the speech by Caiaphas, Matt. 26:57–68). Being deemed too risky led to Jesus almost being thrown over a cliff at the edge of Nazareth (Luke 4:29).

Christ’s own story highlights the importance of solidarity with those subject to unjust surveillance today, particularly with those who bear the burden of public perceptions of risk. There are brown skinned people about whom fellow passengers have raised concerns when hearing them speak Arabic in the airline departure lounge (Araiza 2015). Actor and designer Waris Ahluwalia, a Sikh, was reportedly delayed by AeroMexico in February 2016 because of security measures prompted by his beard and turban (Agrawal 2016).

The ecclesial body of Christ is also a surveilled body. This has been linked with persecution, for example, in the former Soviet Union, in China, and more recently in northern Iraq. However, surveillance is directed at the ecclesial body of Christ not only by the state or quasi-state organizations. The Church engages in self-surveillance. Sacramental confession or pastoral home visitation are familiar, long-standing traditions. Much more recently, surveillance technologies such as facial recognition systems are available to track attendance at events, CCTV systems are deployed on, and sometimes in, churches (Churchix 2017). Apps for measuring spiritual progress and prompting prayer or bible reading are widely available in what is an extension of self-discipline into digital environments that encourage self-quantification. Social media, through which Christians shape one another’s spirituality, are systems of peer- or lateral-surveillance (Trottier 2015).

The Church is, in these respects, a surveilling body. She watches over her members – with varying degrees of intrusion. Particularly where security fears are high – although the level of threat may be very low – the Church monitors its car parks and entrances to buildings. A small industry has emerged that markets security equipment and training to large, but also small, congregations, particularly in the south of the USA (Lewis 2012).

Christ is one who surveils. The notion of God watching in care and in judgment is familiar to readers of the Psalms (Ps 139). A traditional paradigm is captured in the mosaics or paintings of Christ Pantocrator looking down from the apse of a cathedral, an imperial ruler watching from on high. A better frame is to conceptualise Christ as surveillance from the Cross (Stoddart 2011). This is a counter to monarchical models because cruciform surveillance invites reflection on Christ’s solidarity with all who are under unjust surveillance, as was He. Given the complex political/media discourses that permeate contemporary surveillance there is a need to reform a theology of the body of Christ, the Church, in terms of surveillance.

Traditionally, the church is understood as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. It is therefore, a holy surveilled and surveilling body. To talk of holiness in the context of surveillance is problematic if holiness is rendered in the paradigm of clean/unclean sacrificial rites. Such categorization processes were a means of inscribing order into an unpredictable, even chaotic, world. As Mary Douglas argues, ‘in countering that which “offends against order” a community is “reordering [its] environment, making it conform to an idea”’ (Douglas 1966, 2). When people, with disabilities or non-covenental ethnic identity, are excluded in the tradition, any contemporary critique of surveillance by social sorting is significantly dulled. If, however, ‘holy’ is more carefully interpreted in the sense of being set apart for God, expressed in barrier-overcoming-compassion, some interesting features can be observed.
If to be holy is to be set apart for God then this draws attention to the place of the Church in salvation-history and, here, the place of surveillance in salvation-history. Surveillance was crucial in maintaining a covenantal community – by policing the boundaries of community membership and consequent responsibilities and entitlements. In the New Testament we find identification and authentication protocols in place (but partially and problematically) in order to ensure apostolic endorsement of travelling leaders in the nascent Church (e.g., 2 Peter 2; 2 Cor. 10). In these respects, covenant and surveillance go together. Monitoring and seeking to influence behaviour is not necessarily a bad thing and, in effect, is a vital dimension of sustaining a community that will convey and perform God’s Word of care.

By reflecting on Christ having been under surveillance, the Church needs to take the dangers of surveillance (its own practices and those of corporations and states) seriously. Abuses of surveillance, for political advantage, demand focused critique. To be set apart also carries the sense of not being conformed to the world (Rom. 12:2). As a user of surveillance technologies the Church requires to be alert to justifying surveillance on the basis of spurious, prejudicial, cultural tropes about the dangerous Other. A number of members of the church will, in their professional lives, be amongst those who design or authorize the deployment of surveillance technologies. Their immersion in cultures of surveillance (its own practices and those of corporations, marketers and deployers of surveillance technologies) engages with the demands of travelling leaders in the nascent Church (e.g., 2 Peter 2; 2 Cor. 10). In these respects, covenant and surveillance go together. Monitoring and seeking to influence behaviour is not necessarily a bad thing and, in effect, is a vital dimension of sustaining a community that will convey and perform God’s Word of care.

Holiness defined in Matthean terms (feeding the hungry, and clothing the naked as in Matt. 25:31-46) rather than Levitical purity, propels the Church into critical consciousness of her own surveillance practices and those of the state and corporations. “The least of these” being under unjust surveillance is tantamount to Christ himself being unjustly surveilled. Where the Church endorses or is silent about state surveillance that neglects humanitarian concerns (often under the guise of “national security”) the Church is being unfaithful to her calling to be holy.

As much as there are significant benefits in contemporary surveillance, a paradigm of the surveilled and surveilling body of Christ attunes us to the unequal distribution of surveillance. A theological suspicion of the mean and its association with an ideology of “the normal” requires to be deployed for the benefit of whole persons (their bodies and data-doubles). The process of categorization is riddled with political and social assumptions and biases. Marcel-la Althaus-Reid warns against ‘artificially unified identities’ and posits indecent theology that seeks “diversity, possibility and the sense of irreducibility which comes from people at the margin” (Althaus-Reid 2004: 143). A theology of surveillance is required that rejects binary categorization and its associated rhetoric of in/out, good/bad, and safe/risky. Christ destabilizes his own, and therefore others’ identities, including both his disciples’ and opponents’. A fundamental question for the body of Christ is how it watches with care in surveillance cultures so as not to ape those cultures.

Conclusions

The heritage of intrusive, over-bearing disciplinary mechanisms practiced by the Church, and imperial paradigms of a threatening Divine watching are hurdles over which any constructive criticism of contemporary surveillance cultures must jump. Talking of cruciform, rather than holy, surveillance is more helpful. In the way this chapter suggests, there is scope for re-framing discussions of systems that overcomes the tenebrous heritage of oppressive Divine monitoring. A paradigm of resurrecting the digital person, in the light of Christ’s solidaristic watching from the Cross, offers considerable scope for appreciating the positive, and challenging the negative, dimensions of ubiquitous 21st century surveillance. Such a message, and its performance, is significant not only for the Church’s own practices but in her commission to form disciples and be a light to the world. People of Christian faith are, in their professional vocations, designers, manufacturers, marketers and deployers of surveillance technologies. They engage with the demands of share-holders, politicians, and the public who are, in various ways, invested in the cultures of fear, suspicion that energize surveillance in 21st century life. Reforming the body under surveillance is thus a practical theological concern in terms of Christian education and also a dimension of public, prophetic, critique.
References


